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Abstract
Buber’s distinction between the ‘I-It’ mode and the ‘I-Thou’ mode is seminal for dialogic education. While Buber intro-
duces the idea of dialogic space, an idea which has proved useful for the analysis of dialogic education with technology, 
his account fails to engage adequately with the role of technology. This paper offers an introduction to the significance of 
the I-It/I-Thou duality of technology in relation with opening dialogic space. This is followed by a short schematic history 
of educational technology which reveals the role technology plays, not only in opening dialogic space, but also in expand-
ing dialogic space. The expansion of dialogic space is an expansion of what it means to be ‘us’ as dialogic engagement 
facilitates the incorporation, into our shared sense of identity, of aspects of reality that are initially experienced as alien or 
‘other’. Augmenting Buber with an alternative understanding of dialogic space enables us to see how dialogue mediated 
by technology, as well as dialogue with monologised fragments of technology (robots), can, through education, lead to an 
expansion of what it means to be human.
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1  The twofold nature of signs
Although not all those who write about dialogic education 
refer to Buber, all refer, in different ways, to the fundamental 
distinction that Buber drew between learning from a liv-
ing dialogue involving responsive voices (I-Thou) and the 
kind of ‘knowledge’ that just imposes a single perspective 
expanding the realm of the same and objectifying all other-
ness (I-It). For dialogic education, learning is not primarily 
conceived of as about collecting facts and returning them 
in an examination, but is about engaging with different per-
spectives in a way that expands the understanding of the 
learner and their capacity to see things from more than one 
point of view1.
Buber’s writing on the nature of I-Thou relations expands 
our understanding of dialogue. In particular, Buber opens 
the way to understanding dialogue as more than that inter-
subjectivity in which two separate consciousnesses engage 
with each other. Intersubjectivity is part of dialogue, cer-
tainly, but, Buber’s (1937) accounts of dialogue with non-
human subjects such as trees and animals suggest that we 
need to adapt and expand this model of dialogue.
The ‘intersubjectivity’ interpretation of dialogue, devel-
oped by psychologists such as Rommetveit (1998), begins 
with the reality of separate consciousnesses and does not 
question this assumption, viewing dialogue as an exchange 
between separate consciousnesses characterised by mutual 
attunement. Buber’s analysis suggests that dialogue is more 
fundamentally rooted in an ‘orientation’ to the other that 
opens a space of potential meaning preceding, and exceed-
ing, the self/other distinction. Although Buber did not 
engage directly with the question of technology, this version 
of dialogic theory opens the way to understand the essential 
role that technology plays in dialogue and why it is possible 
to learn from (e.g.) interactions with a machine.
In the notebooks published after his untimely death Mau-
rice Merleau-Ponty points out that, on a visit to Manches-
ter, it was only when he did not understand what the taxi 
driver was saying to him that he thought ‘those are words 
there’ (Merleau-Ponty 1968). His point was that normally 
when we use words to speak together we do not notice the 
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words, we go straight through to the meanings. Merleau-
Ponty was influenced by Heidegger, and this observation 
can be seen as an application of Heidegger’s account of 
‘breakdown’ in which our knowledge of objects shifts from 
being ‘ready-to-hand’ to being ‘present-to-hand’ (Heidegger 
1996, pp. 66–99). Heidegger pointed out that when we use 
a tool such as a hammer, we forget the hammer itself as we 
are aware more of the task we are engaged in. In the act of 
hammering, the hammer becomes an extension of ourselves. 
It is only when there is a breakdown, for example, when 
we miss the nail and hit a thumb instead, that we become 
fully aware of the hammer as an object in the world. Hei-
degger’s analysis of the embodied nature of knowing was 
extensively applied to human–computer interface design in 
a seminal study by Winograd and Flores (1986). The main 
finding of this analysis is that we only become aware of 
tools (including words or other signs) as objects when there 
is a breakdown in the task that we are using the tools for. 
Good design is when we are no longer aware of underlying 
and enabling interfaces, but simply extend ourselves to be 
able to do new things, to see new things and to interact with 
others in new ways.
It follows from this analysis that when we are using tech-
nology successfully our sense of self extends into that tech-
nology. This point is expressed in the common saying ‘a 
man with a hammer is a man in search of a nail’. Similarly, 
Merleau-Ponty did not normally distinguish himself clearly 
from the words he was using both to speak and to listen. As 
a result, he was engaged in the dialogue until there was a 
breakdown in communication that forced him to step back 
from dialogue and realise that ‘those are words there’.
Merleau-Ponty’s simple anecdote points to the dual 
nature of signs as both objects in the world (such as words 
audible in the air or visible when written down), and as the 
invisible medium of relationships in which our sense of self 
is extended to include others we are in dialogue with. A ver-
sion of this duality lies at the heart of the new discipline of 
‘presence’ in immersive virtual reality environments (IVR), 
that is, ‘the illusion of being here or there’ (Biocca 2001). 
In IVR, presence happens when the ‘signs’ of artificiality 
disappear into an experience of reality. However, when, like 
Merleau-Ponty, we find ourselves thinking “those are signs 
there—what do they signify?”, we experience a ‘break in 
presence’ (i.e., we stop responding to the virtual stream of 
data and instead respond to the real sensory stream; Slater 
et al. 2003).
Buber begins his classic work I and Thou (first published 
in 1923 and translated to English in 1937) with the claim 
that “man is twofold”, and draws our attention to the two 
fundamental modes of being: ‘I-It’ (Ich-Es) and ‘I-Thou’ 
(Ich-Du). The I-It mode generates a world of objects block-
ing the view such that we often find ourselves trapped within 
it. The I-Thou mode on the other hand leads us into the 
presence of another person and, more fundamentally, into 
the presence of what Buber refers to as ‘the Eternal Thou’. 
He explains that being in relationship is a very different kind 
of being from the being of the It-world—the world of things. 
Whereas the realm of I-It is fragmented, one thing next to 
another, one he, one she, one it, etc, the realm of I-Thou is 
an experience of wholeness (Buber 1958).
In this paper we build on Buber to argue that constructive 
dialogue with technology is possible, even essential, and that 
this takes the form of opening a dialogic space (Buber’s “das 
Zwischen” or the “space of the ‘in-between’”). However, 
we also argue against Buber that dialogic spaces do not all 
take the same form, but that they take a multitude of forms 
depending, to a large extent, on the mediating technology.
Buber’s account of the relationship with the Eternal Thou 
points to an underlying truth of dialogue, but, from the per-
spective of human experience, it is also an extreme case or 
exaggeration. Most dialogic spaces are spaces in which we 
experience multiple voices within a world. This world is not 
always or simply an encompassing physical world—it is a 
culturally meaningful world, mediated by communications 
technology, where the I-It and the I-Thou are mutually inter-
twined in ways that are framed by technological design. The 
expansion of dialogic space is an expansion of what it means 
to be ‘us’ as dialogic engagement facilitates the incorpora-
tion, into our shared sense of identity, of aspects of reality 
that are initially experienced as alien or ‘other’. Therefore, 
for example, when signs take us straight through into living 
dialogues with other voices, our sense of ‘us’ expands to 
include others in a shared dialogic space. However, when 
there is a breakdown, perhaps the image of a face talking on 
the screen becomes frozen, then we are projected back into 
a reduced sense of self.
The idea of an expansion of what it means to be ‘us’ does 
not work if we assume a monologic identity. In a dialogue, 
I do not expand to incorporate you in some monologic or 
totalitarian manner. The idea of the expansion of ‘us’ in the 
expansion of dialogic space is based on the assumption of 
dialogic identity. This is a twofold or dual identity. In a dia-
logue, when one speaks in active mode, one identifies with 
one’s own speaking voice as different from the other voice. 
However, if the dialogue is to be a shared inquiry within 
which learning occurs, there is also a second level of passive 
identification with the dialogue as a whole which includes 
all the other voices and oneself as a voice amongst them. 
Tacitly the other voices are allowed across the threshold of 
the self. One listens to them, and learns from them, much 
as one listens to and learns from one’s own voices (Bakhtin 
1981, p. 343).
In this section, we have begun to consider the seminal 
nature of Buber’s work for the field of dialogic education 
with technology, including his interpretation of opening a 
dialogic space (which has particular implications for the 
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analysis of dialogic education with technology). We have 
also discussed the twofold nature of signs, relating this to 
Buber’s claim that there are two fundamental modes of 
being. In the next section, we examine the twofold nature of 
technology, and how our use of language is also a technol-
ogy. We follow this by drawing on examples from the his-
tory of educational technology to reveal the role technology 
plays, not only in opening dialogic space, but also in expand-
ing dialogic space. In doing so, we augment Buber with an 
alternative understanding of dialogic space to enable us to 
see how dialogue mediated by technology, as well as dia-
logue with monologised fragments of technology (robots), 
can, through education, lead to an expansion of what it 
means to be human.
2  The twofold nature of technology
In an article about technology, education and also what it 
means to be human, it might seem important to define terms. 
Buber’s two modes of being, the I-It objectifying mode and 
the I-Thou dialogic mode, are also relevant to the issue of 
definition and, more generally, how we understand concepts 
and the nature of conceptual thought. In the I-Thou mode 
every part is, as Merleau-Ponty put it ‘a total part’, that is a 
kind of metaphor or way of seeing the world (1968, p. 218). 
What is and what is not seen as technology changes and 
develops over time and across cultures, as do our ideas of 
education and what is included and excluded in the term 
humanity. If we switch from I-It to I-Thou mode we find 
that these terms, technology, education and humanity, do not 
so much refer to substantive areas of a reality already ‘out 
there’, but to orientations that we can take up and that shape 
our ways of thinking and of being.
When people talk of technology in relation with educa-
tion they seldom mean the long-established technologies 
of pens, ink and paper, or blackboards and chalk, or even 
printing presses and books. They almost invariably mean 
‘new’ digital technologies like tablet computers (e.g., iPads) 
and interactive whiteboards. That is interesting, and sug-
gests that where technologies have become part of everyday 
life they are no longer experienced as technology. If they 
are not experienced as technology this is because they are 
experienced as normal, as natural and, indeed, as extensions 
of ‘us’ or what it means to be human. We only say ‘that is 
technology there’ when we do not accept it as part of our 
humanity but experience it as alien and, therefore, perhaps, 
as changing us, limiting us and controlling us in ways that 
we might not want.
In this article we take technology broadly to refer to what 
Vygotsky (1986) called ‘mediating means’ enabling com-
munication and action. This includes spoken and written 
language, along with more obvious tools such as computers. 
Although of course there are many differences in educational 
technologies and their uses in different contexts, we choose 
to focus upon that which unites them all which is their role 
as mediating means within the teaching and learning rela-
tionship. Our argument is that education has always been 
shaped by the mediating means used but that commenta-
tors have not always shown awareness of this. In keeping 
with the dominant assumptions of his time, Buber writes of 
dialogue, and even educational dialogues, as if these were 
unmediated. Becoming aware of the importance of media-
tion to dialogues enables us to see how we can change the 
technological form of the mediation in order to expand the 
dialogue.
Bernard Stiegler argues that Western philosophy has been 
shaped by a systematic avoidance of the question of tech-
nology. Whereas humanity has consistently been defined 
against technology, in fact we find that it is technology that 
initially defines the human and that continues to co-evolve 
with the human in a mutually constitutive way. According 
to Stiegler, quoting various empirical research sources, the 
development of hand-stone technology freed the mouth for 
vocalisations and these two technological developments, tool 
use and speech, led to the development of the frontal cortex:
This ground breaking [frayage], which is that of corti-
calization, is also effected in stone, in the course of the 
slow evolution of techniques of stonecutting. An evo-
lution so slow—it still occurs at the rhythm of ‘genetic 
drift’—that one can hardly imagine the human as its 
operator, that is, as its inventor; rather, one much more 
readily imagines the human as what is invented (Stie-
gler 1998, p. 134).
In this way Stiegler suggests that the ‘human’ is always 
already technological. More than that, each generation finds 
itself in an already technologically shaped reality where our 
way of thinking and our capacity to think at all is already 
mediated by technology, since, for Stiegler, it is only tech-
nology that brings in the space of difference required for 
reflection, particularly the technology of language.
Perhaps we do not normally refer to spoken language as 
a technology because it seems so close to our flesh, words 
carried on warm breath seem like a natural extension of our 
bodies and so of ourselves. Yet when we switch attitude to an 
I-It stance and observe them as if from the outside, we can 
see, as Merleau-Ponty suggested, ‘those are words there’. 
In doing so, we realise that language is also a technology, 
albeit one of the very first human technologies, and one that 
provides a supportive medium for many others.
Following Simondon (1958, 2001), Stiegler argues that 
technologies have their own logic of development. The ten-
dency for initially different technologies to universalise and 
integrate in global systems might not be driven by human 
desires but by a technological logic. Stiegler’s rethinking of 
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history from the point of view of technology suggests that 
we may be deceiving ourselves when we tell the story of how 
humans have used technology for their own ends. In fact, it 
might be just as plausible to see the history of humanity as 
the story of how technology has recruited humans to serve 
its ends. School education is a good example. It is expe-
rienced by many children as unnatural and painful, but is 
required if the technology of literacy is to be able to work. 
This suggests that technology is not an optional extra that 
we can ignore but, rather, is essential to our nature. In doing 
so, technological drives combine with, and co-evolve with, 
human drives and continue to define who we are and how 
we develop over history.
If modern humanity, through educational means such as 
alphabetisation, are impregnated with technology on the 
inside, so technology, in all its forms, is closely intertwined 
with humanity. Just as we tend to confuse people with their 
biological bodies, so we tend to confuse computers with 
their silicon, metal and plastic boxes. However, first and 
foremost, computers are made out of language. The first 
computer existed only as marks on paper written down by 
Alan Turing in the form of a set of procedures. The language 
game behind computers was, and remains, monological; it 
is one of formal logic that seeks to maintain self-coherence. 
This is a ‘technical’ use of language designed specifically to 
remove the ambiguity that comes from dialogue between a 
multiplicity of voices in order to leave only one true perspec-
tive (Pylyshyn and Bannon 1989).
Digital technology is made from language fixed in the 
objective ‘I-It’ mode. However, for Buber intelligence is an 
effect of I-Thou communication. It follows that claims of 
Artificial Intelligence (AI), at least as these are applied to 
silicon-based digital computers, are greatly exaggerated.
3  Lessons from ELIZA and computers 
in the classroom
3.1  ELIZA
Turing famously proposed a test for AI—the ‘Turing Test’—
if a computer could fool an interlocutor that it was human 
then it would pass the test (Turing 1950). This has been 
criticised as a profoundly silly idea confusing simulation 
with reality, or a map with territory, as it is a bit like saying 
that if a computer can simulate the digestive system then it 
can digest food (Searle 1990).
To demonstrate the limitations of the Turing Test model 
of AI, early computing pioneer Joseph Weizenbaum created 
ELIZA, a very simple pattern-matching machine designed 
to fool listeners into thinking it was another human on the 
model of a psycho-therapist (Weizenbaum 1966). Whatever 
the person asked, Weizenbaum’s program would send it 
back. For instance, if you ask it a question it replies, ‘we 
are talking about you not me’, or if you mention a keyword 
like ‘mother’ it will say, ‘tell me more about your mother?’. 
Weizenbaum’s aim was precisely to undermine the hubristic 
thinking of AI by demonstrating the dumbness and simplic-
ity of his software. This has been referred to as an idea of 
‘artificial stupidity’ (Wegerif 2007) and yet, of course, it had 
the potential to convince people for a while that they were 
in a real dialogue.
Weizenbaum was genuinely surprised that intelligent 
people who knew the simplicity of his software spent hours 
in conversation with ELIZA (Weizenbaum 1976). It turned 
out, however, that talking to ELIZA helped them with their 
problems. Versions are still in use today to assess individu-
als’ cognitive and/or emotive weaknesses or difficulties, and 
to then offer the means to overcome them (Bainbridge 2008). 
A variation of this approach, AVATAR therapy, has recently 
shown large clinically worthwhile benefits for mentally ill 
patients experiencing persistent distressing voices. AVATAR 
makes use of digital representations of psychotic experiences 
to provide a controlled, but realistic, therapeutic encounter 
(Craig et al. 2018). It seems that externalising voices and 
dialoguing with them helps patients to gain insight, greater 
control and ultimately supports change.
ELIZA proves Buber right. While psychologists have 
defined dialogue as a form of intersubjectivity only occur-
ring between two active separate consciousness (e.g., 
Rommetveit), Buber proposed that it was more a matter of 
attitude—of orientation towards the other. With a dialogic 
orientation it was possible, for instance, to enter into dia-
logue with a cat or tree (Buber 1958).
While the tension of incommensurability between two 
external consciousnesses will open up a dialogic space when 
a dialogic attitude is taken, the initial externality and spa-
tial separateness of other consciousnesses is not a necessary 
condition for dialogue. It turns out that dialogue is not so 
much intersubjectivity as opening up a dialogic space of 
reflection and resonance. AVATAR shows how this space of 
dialogue can be opened up as much by the tension between 
internal voices, enhanced by external technology acting as 
a simulated dialogue partner, as by that between external 
voices.
In 1997, IBM’s Deep Blue super-computer defeated chess 
grandmaster Gary Kasparov. At the time, predictions were 
made that machine intelligence would soon outperform 
human experts and displace decision making in a range of 
fields (Vardi 2012). Instead, years later, the chess world 
would conclude that decision making was not a matter of 
machine vs expert, but machine plus expert (Goldstein et al. 
2017). This so-called Centaur model features man–machine 
teams that work together on problems and can outperform 
either people, or computers, working alone (Swartout 2016). 
Recently, it has been suggested that Centaur human–machine 
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collaboration could be implemented immediately to improve 
outcomes in a range of complex fields (e.g., cancer care; 
Goldstein et al. 2017).
The stories of Eliza and AVATAR offer examples of 
humans collaborating with machines in a way that augments 
and extends the person on the Centaur model. This is what 
Perkins referred to as ‘Person-plus’ (Perkins 1993). In the 
use of ELIZA and AVATAR the aim is not a computer as an 
alternative consciousness or AI, but rather the computer as 
a constructive dialogue partner able to augment and extend 
the reflective intelligence of our own human dialogues.
3.2  Computer‑supported classroom dialogue
Digital technology is built out of our language and yet often 
appears to us as ‘other’ or as ‘alien’. ELIZA did not appear 
to interlocutors as alien and is an example of what hap-
pens when computers are treated in ‘I-Thou’ mode and are 
allowed to have voice. This I-It/I-Thou duality of computers 
can enable them to be a good tool to support dialogue in the 
classroom.
Computers as partners in learning conversations have an 
ambivalent ontological status. On the one hand, educational 
software can be made to respond appropriately to inputs in 
such a way that users feel the need to explain their responses 
in psychological terms: it is common to say, for example, 
that the computer thinks or makes mistakes. On the other 
hand, even young children quickly learn that computers do 
not have the feelings, expectations and implicit judgements 
that human conversational partners invariably do have (Tur-
kle 1996). This difference can be summed up as due to the 
fact that computers appear as objects, machines, that can 
be programmed to act as if they were subjects, people. This 
ontological ambivalence of computers equips them, in com-
bination with the right educational software and supporting 
pedagogy, to play a unique role in supporting teaching and 
learning dialogues.
In the literature, a dominant interactional exchange 
between teachers and students in the classroom is referred to 
as IRF—Initiation, Response, Feedback (Howe and Abedin 
2013). For example—I: ‘What is the capital of France?’ 
R: ‘Paris’ F: ‘Yes—well done’. The claim has been made 
that providing only brief factual answers to IRF exchanges 
will not give children suitable opportunities in which they 
can practice using language to reason, reflect, enquire and 
explain their thinking to others (e.g., Mercer 2003). When 
Seymour Papert (1980) condemned the use of computers as 
tutorial machines, instead praising their use as open-ended 
environments in which to build and explore, he failed to 
take account of Buber’s I-It/I-Thou duality. In condemning 
the use of computers as tutors he was implicitly assuming 
that they necessarily had the same conversational impact as 
teachers.
Applying Buber’s I-It/I-Thou duality to understanding 
computers in this situation shows that the implicit claim 
that IRF interactions with computers have the same effect 
as IRF interactions with a human ‘tutor’ are not necessar-
ily warranted. Computers are an obvious ‘It’ that can only 
simulate a ‘Thou’ mode. For example, students can wait 
before they answer a computer without feeling that they are 
showing a lack of respect. Indeed, students are not likely to 
feel ‘controlled’ by computers in ways that they might feel 
controlled by a human tutor taking the same role; as a result, 
simple IRF interactions with computers can support discus-
sion, reflection and the active construction of meaning in a 
way that they may not normally do so with human teachers. 
This claim is summed up in the idea of an IDRF educa-
tional exchange around computers where the ‘D’ stands for 
discussion between students. A combination of pedagogy 
and software design can exploit the ambivalent nature of 
computers to make them serve as both interactive agents, 
or ‘tutors’, and as passive ‘learning environments’ within 
the one educational exchange (Wegerif 2004). This edu-
cational dialogue model (IDRF) is an example of Centaur 
human–machine collaboration, making use of a combination 
of the very different affordances of humans and machines to 
maximise learning.
In other words, computers can open dialogic space and 
are good at inducting students into the longer term dialogues 
of culture. The very fact that computers are not human and 
have their own limitations are why they can be very produc-
tive talk partners. In the previous section we considered how, 
in some contexts, this difference between computers and 
humans can be of benefit (e.g., in psychotherapeutic interac-
tions). The combination of a humanlike ability to ask ques-
tions with a machinelike patience and lack of judgement also 
has potential to be very effective in other learning situations, 
for instance, to help children with autism spectrum disorder 
[i.e., because computers are dialogue partners (I-Thou) who 
actually have no subjectivity or real intelligence to worry 
about (I-It)]. Indeed, there is growing evidence on the poten-
tial applications of using technology as a means of enhanc-
ing the life skills of such children (Yasar 2016).
4  Dialogic space
In addition to talking about the shift from the ‘I-It’ attitude 
to the ‘I-Thou’ attitude, Buber also articulated a view that 
dialogue takes place in “das Zwischen” or the “space of the 
‘in-between’” (1937). This is the first clear reference to the 
idea of opening up a ‘dialogic space’, a concept now increas-
ingly used in education (Lambirth 2016).
Dialogic education takes place through dialogue, which 
means opening up a shared space so different perspectives 
can interact and new learning can occur. This notion of an 
 AI & SOCIETY
1 3
internal or lived experience of a shared dialogic space is 
central (Mercer et al. 2010). In teaching through the opening 
of a shared dialogic space, dialogic education draws learners 
into participation in the processes through which knowledge 
is constructed and validated. In other words, dialogic educa-
tion promotes dialogue as an end in itself.
While Buber points us to dialogic space, he mystifies this 
by ignoring the role of technology (defined broadly—as dis-
cussed in Sect. 2) in opening and sustaining it. Furthermore, 
Buber’s dialogic space is not the kind of space that could be 
expanded because it is always presented by Buber as outside 
of space and time. To understand how dialogic space can 
be expanded by technology, we must consider an alterna-
tive conceptualisation of dialogic space in education. This 
alternative conceptualisation arose from applied educational 
research involving the exploration of the impact of differ-
ent types of talk on students’ learning (in upper primary/
elementary classrooms with children aged 8–10). Three sig-
nificant types of talk were identified (Mercer 1995; Wegerif 
and Mercer 1996): disputational, cumulative and explora-
tory. Two of these types could be clearly characterised by 
orientations and identifications used by the learners. In dis-
putational talk children disagreed with each other without 
giving reasons, identifying with their own self-image or 
ego and each wanting to be the one to ‘get’ the answer. In 
cumulative talk children often identified with the image of 
the group as a harmonious unit and so did not want to criti-
cise (i.e., agreeing with each other but not giving reasons). 
The form of identification determined to be associated with 
‘exploratory talk’ was the ability to change one’s mind as 
a result of engaging in talk with others. This prompted the 
question, from what position is it that individual learners 
are able to look at what they have said, find it wrong, and 
so change their minds? Conceptualising this practical issue 
in such a way led the research team to introduce the idea of 
identification with a ‘space of dialogue’ or ‘dialogic space’ 
(Wegerif and Mercer 1997; Wegerif 2007).
There is a difference between this version of dialogic 
space and Buber’s. While Buber’s ‘in-between’ is always 
a highly abstract notion, the theory of ‘dialogic space’ out-
lined above has a concrete aspect. This was seen recently 
during research undertaken in Japan when a group of three 
upper primary children were arguing about a puzzle pre-
sented on a tablet computer. Not only did their body lan-
guage converge on this central focus, but so did their fingers. 
Each put a finger on the tablet to point out what they thought 
the key to solving the puzzle was. Pretty soon it was clear 
that much of the shared thinking was being done by their 
fingers (Fujita, in preparation).
Before dialogic space opens up, things tend to be thought 
of as located in space using the default ‘identity ontology’ 
or everyday monologism that Buber characterised as the I-It 
mode. Identity ontology suggests that ‘a thing is what it is 
and not another thing’ (Thompson 2012). When dialogic 
space opens up, however, then material objects, bodies, 
hands, voices, gestures, and pixels on the screen become 
signs for other things and representative of voices that are 
not present. The pepper and salt pots on the café table are 
just pepper and salt pots. Depending on the dialogue, how-
ever, the pepper pot could become Lionel Messi scoring a 
goal in soccer for FC Barcelona, dribbling brilliantly around 
the salt pot and into a goal marked out by knives and forks. 
Or, the two pots could represent the relationship between a 
proton and a neutron in a deuterium atom surrounded by an 
electron cloud of scattered pepper on the table. In fact, these 
two simple objects could stand in for almost anything at all.
Although each opening of dialogic space is unique, all 
dialogic spaces, once opened, share something in common. 
While in practice any given dialogic space might have a 
limited range of themes and probable outcomes these can-
not be determined in advance because, in principle, any 
real dialogue opens up a potential for infinite meaning. As 
Bakhtin (1986) suggests, there can be no last word in dia-
logue. This idea of the potential for infinite meaning relates 
to Buber’s idea that all dialogues involve us in dialogue with 
the ‘Eternal Thou’ (Buber 1958), but could also be seen as 
just another way of saying that the context that could be 
brought into play in any dialogue is unbounded. Referring 
in the singular to dialogic space, rather than dialogic spaces, 
draws attention to this unity of the structure of dialogic space 
as always opening up unbounded contextual meaning within 
the diversity of specific contexts. However, of course, dia-
logic spaces are also all different in their physical location2.
Buber overlooks the role of technology in writing of dia-
logic space always in the singular in ways that imply that it 
is always outside of space and time. Buber’s dialogic space 
was clearly not the kind of space that could be measured 
such that one could say it contracts or expands. Wegerif’s 
version of dialogic space, because it has one pole situated 
in the everyday experience of space and time, can be under-
stood to expand in so far as it includes more voices and a 
deeper questioning of framing grounds. This is something 
we explore in the following section.
2 The neologism of ‘dialogic space(s)’ would be the most accurate 
term with the singular ‘space’ referring to the unbounded ideas side 
and the plural ‘spaces’ to the physical concrete side.
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5  Illustrations of the expansion of dialogic 
space from the history of educational 
technology
The history of educational technology, understood broadly 
as the mediating means within the teaching and learning 
relationship, provides a simple demonstration of our claim 
that technology can change dialogic space and expand it 
in ways that have educational significance.
5.1  Cave paintings
Educational technology can be traced back at least 
40,000 years when early tools were used to communicate 
through cave paintings (Barton and Baguley 2017, p. 274). 
This involved early humans using “cutting-edge” technol-
ogy, for the time, to explain their surrounding physical 
world and to fulfil a need to communicate knowledge and 
experience with others (Teehan 2006, p. 7). In this sense, 
cave paintings acted as an early form of educational tech-
nology as they allowed of a new type of cognitive pro-
cessing; that is, cave art enabled the extension of human 
cognitive abilities (“out of the skull and into the world”) 
and the externalisation of information (Gray 2010).
Fifteen thousand years ago, the Paleolithic denizens 
of the Lascaux, Pechmerle or Altamira caves laboured to 
represent aspects of reality which were vital to their life 
(Mioduser 2005). Other cave paintings, exhibiting similar 
themes in various areas around the world, are estimated to 
be over 25,000 years old (Gray 2010). Initially, these paint-
ings were widely thought of as a kind of magic intended 
to increase the number of animals and improve the hunt (a 
theory developed primarily by Abbe Henri Breuil, interest-
ingly around the same time that Vygotsky developed his 
notion of tool-mediated action—see Edwards (2005) for 
an overview). This ‘hunting magic’ theory was dominant 
until it was contradicted more recently by Lewis-Williams 
(2002) and others (e.g., Spivey 2005) who highlighted that 
the animals painted in the caves did not reflect local diets.
Lewis-Williams (2002) presents ethnographic evidence 
based on transcribed notes of interviews with San hunter-
gatherers from the 1870s to conclude that the cave paint-
ings were, in effect, a form of educational technology. He 
suggests that Shamans, or those able to voluntarily enter 
into trance states and see visions, used the paintings to 
record visions and evoke them later.
The idea of early civilisations utilizing cave paintings 
to evoke spiritual energies after engaging in activities to 
induce an altered state of consciousness does sound rather 
remote from our conception of contemporary education 
and technology. This example is interesting, however, 
because the suggested use of the paintings is clearly edu-
cational. Following an initiation ceremony involving what 
could be called a pedagogy of extreme challenge (e.g., sen-
sory deprivation; Clottes 2008), the cave art was used to 
provoke an encounter with ‘voices’ that are not everyday 
but belonged to the shared cultural life of the tribe. These 
voices inhabit not normal space and time but rather a type 
of cultural spirit world (Lewis-Williams and Pearce 2004).
To enter this world via the mediation of the cave painting, 
‘learners’ had to de-identify with their everyday world and 
self. The painted walls of caves operated like a thin mem-
brane between the everyday world and spirit world beyond, 
a membrane that the Shaman could cross at will serving 
as a guide for others (Lewis-Williams 1997, 2002). On the 
other-side was a world of shared visions, which the new 
members of the community could be initiated into. Thus, 
this early form of education enabled individuals to become 
‘fully human’ as they entered the cultural life of the tribe by 
engaging with spirit voices often referred to as the ances-
tors of the tribe. In doing so, they acquired a spiritual body 
in the shared spiritual space of the tribe, in addition to their 
original physical body in the shared physical space.
Paintings on the cave wall had an I-Thou quality for mem-
bers of the tribe that used the cave. The shapes of animals 
would come alive and talk back. However, to outsiders they 
just have an I-It quality. We see them only as pictures and 
not as voices. However, for the tribe who painted them, by 
perduring over time, over thousands of years in many cases, 
cave paintings provided voices that could support continuity 
and development as each new generation were inducted into 
an ongoing dialogue with their ancestors. As an education 
technology, this expanded the space of dialogue with the 
spirit voices of the tribe in a temporal direction, but less so 
a spatial dimension (see Innis 1950).
The idea of dialogue with spirit voices needs considering 
here. This was something that Buber explicitly addressed 
and included in his understanding of dialogue. Bakhtin, who 
was influenced by Buber (Clark and Holquist 1984), and 
whom once said that he thought of Martin Buber as “the 
greatest philosopher of the twentieth century” (Freidman 
2001), made some sense of the almost universal experience 
of dialogue with spirit voices through his concept of the 
super-addressee:
“[I]n addition to [the immediate addressee] the author 
of the utterance, with a greater or lesser awareness, 
presupposes a higher super-addressee (third) whose 
absolutely just responsive understanding is presumed, 
either in some metaphysical distance or in distant his-
torical time... In various ages and with various under-
standings of the world, this super-addressee and his 
ideally true responsive understanding assume vari-
ous ideological expressions (God, absolute truth, the 
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court of dispassionate human conscience, the people, 
the court of history, science, and so forth)” (Bakhtin 
1986).
This idea of the super-addressee as an invisible witness 
or perspective who participates in all dialogues suggests that 
we are always dialoguing with cultural voices, the voices 
of the ancestors perhaps, as well as with physically present 
humans. George Herbert Mead, for example, referred to the 
importance of the voice of the Generalised Other or ‘what 
everybody thinks’ for learning to reason within a commu-
nity (Meade 1934). However, following the logic of Buber, 
these naturally emergent super-addressee voices should not 
be reified in I-It mode. Whenever they are, as with fixed 
images of ‘what everybody thinks’, or fixed images of God 
and goodness, then when we engage with them in I-Thou 
mode a new super-addressee (witness) emerges, and then a 
new one and so on. That is, if you try to pin down a super-
addressee position in order to dialogue with it you will find 
that another super-addressee position is automatically gener-
ated. Buber’s intuition that the real dialogue is ultimately not 
with this or that pinned down and circumscribed ‘Thou’, but 
with what he calls ‘the Eternal Thou’, therefore, is supported 
by Bakthin’s super-addressee idea (Bakthin 1986, p. 126).
5.2  Writing
Socrates was an oral thinker who lived and taught during 
a time when there was transition to a new communications 
technology, the technology of alphabetic writing. This new 
technology was impacting the nature of education in a way 
that troubled Socrates. Somewhat ironically, however, we 
only know this because Plato wrote down Socrates’ reflec-
tions on writing in the dialogue with Phaedrus, where he 
is reported as describing written words as like ‘orphans’, 
‘ghosts’ and ‘dead seeds put out on flagstones in the heat of 
the sun’ (Plato—Jowett Translation 2008; Manguel 2014). In 
Buber’s terms, Socrates did not see written words as voices 
that could be in dialogue with each other, but only as ‘Its’ 
(i.e., as objects without life).
Words that are spoken tend to disappear almost as soon as 
they are heard. Without recording them, they remain in the 
context in which they are spoken. The social anthropology 
of oral cultures reveals many wise people like Socrates with 
interesting things to say, but we only know of these because 
the anthropologists are literate and write down their sayings 
just as Plato did for Socrates. If cave paintings and early 
monuments like pyramids extend the educational dialogic 
space of a group in a temporal direction, writing enables 
also a spatial expansion beyond one tribe to other tribes and 
indeed, potentially, to all tribes (Innis 1950).
Arguably, only writing words down enables extended 
memory and education into participation in the dialogue of 
a collective humanity. Oakeshott (1959) writes of education 
as induction into a vast ‘conversation of mankind’ which, 
‘begun in the primeval forests and (is) extended and made 
more articulate in the course of the centuries’. In this con-
versation students can discover the voices of Socrates and 
Plato but also Confucius and Lao Tze, Buddha, Rumi and 
more from all periods and all regions. This is possible only 
because, and only in so far as, these voices are written down. 
From face-to-face dialogues in small groups, the technology 
of writing enables us to expand to a global dialogue.
Socrates turned out to be wrong about writing. Despite 
being in the form of external signs—that is, despite being 
an obvious technology—writing can also support voices 
and the dialogue between voices. Bakhtin developed his 
understanding of dialogic through considering the dialogue 
between and within texts, in particular the dialogue between 
voices within Dostoevsky’s novels (Bakhtin 1984). In one 
sense this returns us to the context of AVATAR therapy 
referred to previously, in which mentally ill patients exter-
nalise and dialogue with their distressing voices mediated 
by computer technology (Craig et al. 2018).
Dostoevsky’s novels were Dostoevsky talking with his 
voices externalised in the technological form of a novel. 
While this was not, for instance, in the form of a computer 
game, many people have found it to be illuminating and 
enlightening nonetheless. Dostoevsky’s voices expanded the 
cultural dialogue for generations of readers who learnt from 
the dialogue between Ivan and Alyosha Karamazov. This 
illustrates how the technology of writing, plus education, 
can expand dialogic space.
5.3  The internet
For over 20 years, the Internet has been replacing print as the 
dominant medium of communication (Poster 2001). In doing 
so, it offers a return to some of the dialogic affordances of 
oracy as, on the Internet, there is always the potential of liv-
ing relationships with multiple voices. Moreover, there is 
no way of stepping outside of this dialogue into a position 
of certainty.
The dialogue of humanity now appears in real-time 
online. The role of education today is not simply to induct 
students into their inheritance of written cultural voices, but 
also to induct them into participation in this living dialogue. 
‘Cyberspace’ is an imaginary, but nonetheless real world, 
where the frontiers are blurred and the ‘other’ exists through 
the inference of communication (Breton 2003). It is not an 
external space that can be measured in terms of servers and 
fibre-optic cables: it is a dialogic space supporting the inter-
play of potentially billions of voices.
The internet is, in many ways, a new cave (see Sect. 5.1). 
The screens our young people are so fascinated by provide 
a means for them to step through into a collective cultural 
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world. The signs on the internet are multi-modal, not simply 
grey words on the page but pictures and living video images. 
Increasingly, with the aid of headsets, the full experience of 
stepping through into 3D reality is offered. This is a return to 
the experience of those creating cave paintings 40,000 years 
ago, but, with a big difference—the Internet is open. It is 
not inducting us into one tribal reality that will close us 
off from other tribes, or, at least, it has the potential not to 
do so. Rather, it has the capacity to support a borderless 
dialogue with infinite creative possibility and also intrinsic 
democratic potential (Fuchs 2005).
Engagement in educational dialogues online offers a new 
form of dialogue not found in face-to-face situations or in 
dialogue with computers in classrooms. The Internet has an 
affordance for a new kind of education that could be called 
peer-to-peer learning. This new form of educational dialogue 
combines a focus of interest—lets us call this the question—
with resources generated by others that can help answer that 
question. Of course, here the Internet is not being viewed as 
an external network, but internally from the point of view 
of participation. This kind of education is through participa-
tion, even in the simple case where someone has a problem, 
types their problem into a search engine, and finds a previ-
ous exchange on an Internet forum that provides a solution 
to the problem. However, where the question is less closely 
defined, such searches easily lead not only to vicarious 
participation in other people’s past exchanges, but also to 
becoming drawn into participation in shared inquiry or a 
shared construction on the Internet. This new form of open 
community dialogue expands across space and time in a dif-
ferent way from previous forms. Each question goes out to 
an unknown horizon. Each response comes back from that 
horizon giving the ‘community’ an apparent concrete form 
when really it is as nebulous in form as a cloud of electrons. 
Because there are no fixed boundaries on the Internet, ulti-
mately the community being dialogued with in this way is 
the whole of the Internet.
The Internet gives an apparently concrete form to Buber’s 
notion of dialogue with the ‘Eternal Thou’ if we translate 
this as the ‘Infinite Other’—or that other that calls us out 
into dialogue but that cannot be contained or understood by 
us as an ‘It’ but is always beyond us as a ‘Thou’ (Wegerif 
2013). However, much dialogue on the Internet is rather less 
satisfactory than Buber’s account of dialogue with the Eter-
nal Thou. The Internet raises new challenges which reduce 
to a failure to use it as a way of engaging in dialogue for 
shared inquiry and increased mutual understanding. Hans-
son (2007) describes how web-based mediation can make 
it harder for students to enter into genuine relations. Poten-
tially, this may be due to a tendency to objectify others or 
because ‘genuine encounters’ are not happening appropri-
ately. Such concerns could be addressed by education. One 
of the criticisms of the Internet’s effects on thinking made 
by Carr (2011) and others is that it leads to distraction and 
superficiality. Teaching children and young people how to 
critically examine information, how to ask good questions 
that will make the best of the vast resources of the Internet, 
and how to work together to deepen shared inquiry, is an 
educational response to the needs of the new Internet Age 
(Wegerif 2013).
One model by which education could work with the Inter-
net to expand dialogic space is as follows. It is not unrea-
sonable to claim that communications technologies influ-
ence education, after all, the very first schools in ancient 
Sumeria were set up to master the complex new technol-
ogy of writing. As we considered previously, education into 
the dialogue of humanity described by Oakeshott (1959) 
only works if there is global literacy. Therefore, in a similar 
way, we may need a universal education into how to think 
together effectively with the Internet if we are to realise its 
potential (Wegerif 2017a).
The Internet as a whole has the potential to be a vast 
intelligence combining human and machine thinking. It does 
not represent a network of separate AIs, but it is, or at least 
could become, one distributed collective intelligence (Lévy 
1997). The kind of intelligence dialogic education promotes 
first of all is what Dewey considered ‘social intelligence’ 
(Giles and Eyler 1994). This is about the capacity of a soci-
ety as a whole to think together, learn together and respond 
appropriately to challenges. Increasingly the Internet leads 
us all to inhabit a global social context, and it is possible that 
dialogic education is one way to respond collectively to the 
many challenges that this raises.
6  Conclusion: the restoration
We began this article with an illustration of Buber’s idea that 
man is twofold. When Merleau-Ponty could not understand 
the speech of a taxi driver in Manchester he said to himself 
‘those are words there’. Normally, he realised, he did not 
notice the words that carried the voices of others but went 
straight through to inhabiting a shared world of meaning. It 
is common now to experience technology as something other 
than human and, indeed, as a threat to humanity. In some of 
his later writings  himself raised the spectre of technology 
as a ‘Golem’, a creation of man that turns against its creator:
“Man is no longer able to master the world which he 
himself brought about: it is becoming stronger than 
he is, it is winning free of him, it confronts him in 
an almost elemental independence, and he no longer 
knows the word which could subdue and render harm-
less the golem he has created ... Man faced the terrible 
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fact that he was the father of demons whose master he 
could not become” ( 1947, pp. 157–158).
However, as we have seen, digital technology is an exten-
sion of us, a reified part of our language. Simondon (1958, 
2001) has argued that it is in the nature of technology to 
create globalising systems. We see this logic of technology 
working out today in the emerging internet of things such 
that here are no truly separate AIs, there is increasingly 
only one AI and it is a globalised and globalising network 
that already includes us. Of course, there are many reasons 
why individuals and groups might feel alienated from this 
growing new order. It can be used, and is being used, to 
serve the interests of some over the interests of others. The 
challenge that we face, therefore, is how to re-incorporate 
the apparent alienness of technology into an expanded dia-
logue. This means we must consider how to expand what it 
means to be us, or to be human, in a way that incorporates 
the global human–machine network that we have created. 
This is an educational challenge. In the print age, education 
satisfied itself with inducting people into the world of books. 
To study a subject at university was to ‘read’ that subject. 
According to Oakeshott, to become educated in this way 
was to become fully human by incorporating a culture. Now, 
perhaps, education has the further challenge of incorporating 
newcomers into the machine–human network that could be 
called an emergent global intelligence.
While ’s account of the twofold nature of dialogue 
between I-Thou and I-It helps us to understand this situa-
tion, there is also a sense in which  mystified our situation by 
ignoring the real nature and importance of technology. For 
dialogue was not technologically mediated. It was something 
human, the essence of humanity in fact. Technology, for , 
is treated merely as a tool that humans use to achieve their 
ends, and has nothing to do with enabling dialogue. This is 
perhaps understandable in the age before the Internet, but the 
advent of new communications technologies has enabled us 
to reflect back on the ubiquitous and necessary role of tech-
nology, words and other materially instantiated sign systems, 
in mediating dialogue. For that reason,  did not understand 
the process whereby technology has expanded dialogic space 
in the past and can continue to do so.
Just as writing has proved not to be a fake intelligence 
opposed to humanity but an extension of human intelligence, 
so AI may prove to be, in Centaur mode, an extension of 
human intelligence and not a threat to it [a vision more akin 
to the early visions of computing that were concerned with 
extending the potential of the human mind, e.g., Bush (1945) 
and Licklider (1960)]. However, this requires an enormous 
expansion of dialogic space to incorporate not only the 
voices of marginalised humans but also the voices of mar-
ginalised and objectified machines, which in turn requires 
that we engage both more insightfully and more respectfully 
with technology.
Certainly, there is a crisis in relation with technology. We 
have argued that applying  helps us understand the nature of 
that crisis and also leads to a suggestion as to how education 
could help to resolve it through the expansion of dialogic 
space. The global human–machine intelligent network that 
is emerging around us is not only an ‘other’ or a ‘golem’ 
opposed to humanity but is also perhaps our potential to be 
more fully human by becoming something more than what 
was previously thought of as a limit for the human. The very 
real threat that humanity is dominated by technology can 
potentially be turned to opportunity through education. Such 
education would draw young people into constructive rela-
tionships with technology (for instance, by making use of 
the ontological ambivalence of machines referred to earlier), 
in addition to inducting them into the use of global networks 
that enable people to think effectively together with the sup-
port of (un-dominating) machines.
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